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Abstract: Studies of  CEOs’ hubris have long found that board vigilance is effective in con-
trolling the negative influence of  CEOs’ hubris on firms’ performance. Past studies specifically 
argued  that the CEOs’ non-duality and independent directors’ representations are the determi-
nants of  board vigilance. However, these studies have only explored the causal relationship in 
the one-tier corporate governance setting. Therefore, this study analyzed the influence of  CEOs’ 
hubris on firms’ performance in Indonesia, by adopting two-tier corporate governance by taking 
into account the CEO-board power dynamics. Hierarchical regressions were performed on 99 
public listed firms. The results found CEOs’ hubris in Indonesia contributes positively to firms’ 
performance, while boards with a large number of  commissioners are effective in strengthen-
ing the positive influence of  hubris on firms’ performance. Furthermore, this study hints that 
two-tier corporate governance is more efficient in controlling hubris than the one-tier system.
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Introduction
Past studies have long found that lead-
ers’ characteristics have influenced their 
strategic decision-making, thus leading their 
firms to success (Koo and  Park, 2018; Wang 
et al., 2016). In executing high-risk projects 
and investments, a CEO’s confident deci-
sion-making is vital (Hiller and  Hambrick, 
2005; H. Park and  Yoo, 2017). CEOs are of-
ten influenced by their past successful expe-
riences when making decisions, even if  they 
did not always yield positive results for their 
firms (Claxton et al., 2015). Business research 
streams proxy this condition as CEOs’ hubris. 
Originating in Greek mythology, hubris is 
used to explain executives’ tyrannical behav-
ior (H. Park and  Yoo, 2017; Petit and  Bol-
laert, 2012). This term has been used when 
explaining failed acquisitions (Roll, 1986), 
acquisition premiums (Hayward and  Ham-
brick, 1997), failed investments (Malmendier 
and  Tate, 2005), and fluctuating firm perfor-
mance (Chatterjee and  Hambrick, 2007). 
CEOs’ hubris is characterized by exces-
sive overconfidence that develops from the 
media’s praise, successful experiences, and 
self-confidence (Asad and  Sadler-Smith, 
2020; Hayward and  Hambrick, 1997; H. Park 
and  Yoo, 2017; Petit and  Bollaert, 2012). 
CEOs’ hubris significantly affects strategic 
decisions, in which CEOs overestimate their 
abilities and manipulate the decision-mak-
ing process (Asad and  Sadler-Smith, 2020; 
Cormier et al., 2016). A proven and effective 
way to mitigate hubris is through board vig-
ilance (Hayward and  Hambrick, 1997; J. H. 
Park et al., 2018). Indicated by the CEOs’ 
non-duality (J. H. Park et al., 2018), and out-
side directors’ representations (Hayward and 
Hambrick, 1997) board vigilance mitigates 
CEOs’ hubris by increasing the monitoring 
of  the CEOs. Thus, CEOs become more 
careful in deciding which projects or invest-
ments to take. 
A study by J. H. Park et al., (2018) ex-
plored the direct link between hubris and 
firm performance in South Korea, and found 
that the country-specific context determines 
the result of  the CEOs’ hubris. CEOs’ hubris 
research in Asia has only been conducted in 
China (Li and  Tang, 2010; Tang et al., 2015; 
Zhang et al., 2020) and South Korea (J. H. 
Park et al., 2018), which makes it important 
to conduct another study in Southeast Asia, 
to widen the research stream. Because of  this 
gap, an extensive study in Indonesia is nec-
essary. 
Indonesia adopted the two-tier system 
that does not allow CEO-duality to appear 
(World Bank, 2014). It is more interesting to 
approach board vigilance from the side of  
the board of  commissioners (BOC). Besides, 
the two-tier system mandates a bigger board 
with diverse personnel who have different 
knowledge and skills (Ali, 2018; Zubeltzu-Ja-
ka et al., 2020) that increases the board’s in-
dependence (Tulung and  Ramdani, 2018) 
and vigilance in monitoring the CEO (J. H. 
Park et al., 2018). Therefore, this study aims 
to expand the CEOs’ hubris research stream 
by conducting research in Indonesia.
Literature Review
CEOs’ Hubris
Originated from ancient Greek, hubris 
is defined as exaggerated pride or self-con-
fidence (Petit and  Bollaert, 2012). In the 
business research stream, this term is used to 
explain an executive’s overconfidence in his/
her strategic decision-making process (H. 
Park and  Yoo, 2017; Powell et al., 2011). The 
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initial study conducted by Roll (1986) found 
that hubristic executives overestimate the val-
ue of  the new entity during the acquisition 
process and have their focus fully on achiev-
ing synergy. These CEOs should have known 
that any bid above the market price means 
an error in the valuation; thus, the bidding 
firms’ shareholders suffer losses (Claxton et 
al., 2015; Haynes et al., 2017).
A further study by Hayward and Ham-
brick (1997) found that shareholders’ losses 
following an acquisition were higher when 
executive hubris was high, as these CEOs 
mistranslated their previous successful or-
ganizational experiences into an ability to 
manage additional entities. CEOs’ hubris 
is the result of  three indicators, namely: (1) 
firm performance, (2) media praise, and (3) 
CEOs’ compensation (Haynes et al., 2017; 
Hayward and  Hambrick, 1997). Media praise 
contributes to hubris by allowing CEOs to 
receive external validation of  their apparent 
capabilities (El-Khatib et al., 2015; Haynes 
et al., 2017; Hayward and  Hambrick, 1997). 
CEOs who have been praised by the media 
also receive glorified treatment from their ac-
quaintances (Haynes et al., 2017; H. Park and 
Yoo, 2017). The distinctive treatment allows 
hubristic CEOs to increase their discretion in 
collecting important information (El-Khatib 
et al., 2015; Haynes et al., 2017; J. H. Park et 
al., 2018). 
The definition of  hubris often overlaps 
with the term high self-esteem (Sadler-Smith 
et al., 2017), core-self-evaluation (Hiller and 
Hambrick, 2005), and narcissism (Chatterjee 
and  Hambrick, 2007). High self-esteem is 
the belief  that an individual can carry out a 
task and that they are entitled to gain bene-
fits from other people’s resources, which lack 
the specific overconfidence features such as 
excessive pride or arrogance  (J. H. Park et al., 
2018; Sadler-Smith et al., 2017). Meanwhile, 
core-self-evaluation (CSE) specifically states 
that the measure of  CSE aligns closely with 
hubris, but only when the level is high, (i.e 
Hyper-CSE) (Hiller and  Hambrick, 2005; 
Sadler-Smith et al., 2017).
Although narcissistic CEOs were found 
to be highly dependent on media and social 
praise, it is a personality trait that differs from 
the cognitive bias (Asad and  Sadler-Smith, 
2020; Chatterjee and  Hambrick, 2007; H. 
Park and  Yoo, 2017). Following the behav-
ioral strategy research stream that classified 
CEOs’ hubris as a cognitive bias in their stra-
tegic decision-making (Powell et al., 2011), 
CEOs’ hubris is defined as a cognitive bias 
that builds upon internal and external con-
structs which result in executives incorrect-
ly measuring their capabilities when deci-
sion-making (H. Park and  Yoo, 2017; J. H. 
Park et al., 2018).
CEOs’ Power Strengthening Effect
A CEO’s power specifically refers to an 
executive’s ability to exert his/her authority 
and thus influence the board of  directors 
and the whole firm (Asad and  Sadler-Smith, 
2020; Koo and  Park, 2018). CEOs are grant-
ed their powers through their position in the 
firm and their high level of  authority and 
ownership (i.e legitimate power), their ex-
pertise in management (i.e expert power), 
and their reputation in an institutional set-
ting (i.e prestige power) (Asad and  Sadler-
Smith, 2020; Kinicki and  Fugate, 2018). As 
the firm’s performance is a reflection of  its 
executives, powerful CEOs accordingly expe-
rience more success (Asad and  Sadler-Smith, 
2020; Hambrick and  Mason, 1984).
The managerial expertise of  executives 
is developed through their time as leaders, 
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thus the level of  power in a firm is paral-
lel to the length of  their managerial tenure 
(Haynes et al., 2017; J. H. Park et al., 2018). 
A long-tenured CEO has experienced more 
success, which is often used to control the 
board since the strategic decision-making 
process involves CEO-board interaction 
(Duru et al., 2016; Koo and  Park, 2018). The 
successful experiences also contribute to a 
strong bond of  trust between the CEO and 
the board (Koo and  Park, 2018; J. H. Park 
et al., 2018). Therefore a powerful CEO may 
lower the level of  the board’s vigilance, which 
increases the possibilities of  the CEO carry-
ing out wealth-destroying projects or invest-
ments (Haynes et al., 2017; H. Park and  Yoo, 
2017; J. H. Park et al., 2018). In short, the in-
crease in the CEO’s tenure is followed by an 
increase in the CEO’s power, which is linked 
to hubris and has a negative influence on the 
firm’s performance (Haynes et al., 2017; J. H. 
Park et al., 2018).
Besides the increasing tenure, it was 
found that CEOs’ ownership, in the form of  
share ownership, also significantly increased 
their executive power over the firm (Deb and 
Wiklund, 2017; Haynes et al., 2017). Owner-
ship is a proxy of  a CEO’s legitimate pow-
er in the firm, which can reduce the level of  
vigilance by the board (Deb and  Wiklund, 
2017; Kinicki and  Fugate, 2018; J. H. Park et 
al., 2018). A CEO who owns shares may in-
fluence both the shareholders and the board 
(Deb and  Wiklund, 2017; Haynes et al., 2017; 
J. H. Park et al., 2018). The CEO who serves 
both as the executive and as a shareholder 
may deceive the shareholders by acting as 
if  his/her actions are in the interest of  the 
shareholders, while actually pursuing no-val-
ue investments (Deb and  Wiklund, 2017; 
Haynes et al., 2017; J. H. Park et al., 2018). In 
short, ownership increases a CEO’s opportu-
nities to pursue non-value investments that 
may have a negative influence on the firm’s 
performance. 
Both tenure and ownership allow a CEO 
the power to influence both the board and 
the shareholders. Consequently, the combi-
nation of  legitimate and expert power is most 
likely to increase the level of  hubris appar-
ent in executives and thereby affect the firm’s 
financial performance (Kinicki and  Fugate, 
2018; J. H. Park et al., 2018). Drawing from 
the existing findings, this study developed its 
hypotheses based on the argument for tenure 
and ownership being the main indicators of  
the CEOs’ power, and this strengthens the 
negative influence of  CEOs’ hubris on firms’ 
financial performance. 
Board Vigilance’s Weakening Effect
Board vigilance’s role in corporate gov-
ernance refers to the board members’ abil-
ity to monitor and disciplin the company’s 
top executives (J. H. Park et al., 2018; Sew-
persadh, 2019). Previous studies found that 
weak board vigilance allowed top executives 
to challenge their board’s monitoring abilities 
and as a result, a negative outcome from hu-
bris is inevitable (Duru et al., 2016; J. H. Park 
et al., 2018). Weak board-vigilance is indicat-
ed as a factor in CEO-duality, and the lack of  
outside directors’ representations (Hayward 
and  Hambrick, 1997; J. H. Park et al., 2018).
Following Indonesia’s Constitution-
al Law No. 40 of  2007, a firm’s corporate 
governance must consist of  three organs: a 
board of  directors (BOD), a board of  com-
missioners (BOC), and the shareholders, as 
presented in Figure 1. The model depicts the 
structure of  corporate governance, the flow 
of  communications, and the responsibilities 
each party has. Meanwhile one-tier corporate 
governance consists of  a board of  directors 
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who are responsible for monitoring both the 
CEO and the strategic decision-making pro-
cess.
Concerning the board’s vigilance, this 
corporate governance model is supposed-
ly effective in repressing the level of  hubris 
in executives, since it eliminates the CEOs’ 
duality (Ali, 2018; J. H. Park et al., 2018). A 
previous study by J. H. Park et al., (2018) 
explored the effectiveness of  independent 
directors, so, this study followed the same 
logic by exploring board vigilance through 
the BOC. The independent commissioners’ 
ratio increases board vigilance by providing 
unbiased monitoring of  the CEO, since they 
do not have any relation to anyone on the 
board (J. H. Park et al., 2018; Ramdani and 
Witteloostuijn, 2010; Tulung and  Ramdani, 
2018). Aside from the independent commis-
sioners’ ratio, this study proposed an alter-
native method for assessing board vigilance, 
by considering the size of  the board of  com-
missioners. According to studies about board 
effectiveness, a bigger board has more prob-
lem-solving capabilities, which are useful for 
determining strategic decisions (Ali, 2018; 
J. H. Park et al., 2018; Zubeltzu-Jaka et al., 
2020). Drawing from the existed studies, this 
study developed hypotheses based on the ar-
gument that the independent commissioners’ 
ratio and board size were the main indicators 
of  board vigilance that weakened the influ-
ence of  CEOs’ hubris on firms’ financial per-
formance.
Hypotheses Development
CEOs’ Hubris and Firms’ Perfor-
mance
There are two different views of  CEOs’ 
hubris: a positive point of  view and a nega-
tive point of  view. The positive view makes 
the argument that a dominant and powerful 
CEO is predominantly a hero, or a savior, 
who is key to the firm’s success (Koo and 
Park, 2018; H. Park and  Yoo, 2017; Zeitoun 
et al., 2019). In contrast, the negative view 
Figure 1.  Indonesia’s Corporate Governance Structure
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argues that CEOs’ hubris is harmful to the 
firms’ performance since hubristic executives 
often pursue investments that are in their 
own self-interests and which can harm their 
firms’ performance (Claxton et al., 2015; 
Zhang et al., 2020). The two polarized views 
indicate that CEOs’ hubris is a double-ended 
sword, with no solid agreement as to whether 
it is contributive or detrimental to firm per-
formance. 
Therefore, following J. H. Park et al., 
(2018) we seek a neutral way of  assessing 
hubris through the concept of  managerial 
entrenchment, with a country-specific con-
text. In a very active capital market, firms are 
exposed to enormous takeover pressures, in 
which poor-performing firms are often the 
victims of  hostile acquisitions (J. H. Park et 
al., 2018). Thus, to satisfy a CEO’s main ob-
jective of  keeping his/her position, hubristic 
CEOs focus on increasing their firms’ value 
and investing in profitable investments, such 
as innovations or product development, as 
a way to make sure they are not subject to a 
takeover (Hirshleifer et al., 2012; J. H. Park et 
al., 2018; Sadler-Smith et al., 2017). In short, 
in an active capital market, CEOs’ hubris is 
beneficial for firms’ performance.
Whereas in a weak capital market that 
does not impose any significant takeover 
threat, hubristic CEOs pursue their self-in-
terest projects which can be detrimental 
to their firms’ performances (Haynes et 
al., 2017; J. H. Park et al., 2018). Hubris-
tic CEOs with past successful experiences 
falsely believe that they have sufficient ca-
pabilities and accurate information to carry 
out their self-interest investments (J. H. Park 
et al., 2018). In short, under a weak capital 
market, CEOs’ hubris is detrimental to firm 
performance.
Following the approaches of  the pre-
vious studies, Indonesia’s capital market is 
considered weak, as indicated by its M&A 
activity of  only 5.4 percent, which is lower 
than the Asia-Pacific average of  10 percent, 
and it is much less developed (Bureau Van 
Dijk, 2017; Darmadi, 2013; Investment, 
2017).
Under low external pressure, hubristic 
CEOs in Indonesia will entrench their po-
sitions by investing in non-value destroying 
projects that negatively influence their firms’ 
performance. Additionally, Indonesia’s high 
power distance and collectivist culture al-
lows CEOs to have more control over deci-
sion making, which motivates them to pur-
sue non-value investments that negatively 
influence their firms’ performance (Koo and 
Park, 2018; Tulung and  Ramdani, 2018). 
Therefore, this study developed its first hy-
pothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1 CEOs’ hubris negatively in-
fluences firms’ performance in Indonesia. 
CEOs’ Tenure
A CEO’s tenure is defined as the length 
of  time spent by an individual working in the 
role of  the CEO of  a firm (McClelland et al., 
2012). As the tenure increase, the CEO ac-
quires more managerial expertise in aligning 
resources and strategy decisions for the firm 
(Sewpersadh, 2019; Wang et al., 2016). Man-
agerial expertise is also used in determining 
the actions taken by a CEO, thus affecting 
the effectiveness of  their leadership of  the 
firm (Carter and  Greer, 2013; Sewpersadh, 
2019). Referring to the source of  hubris as 
media praise and awards, a CEO with a long 
tenure expectedly has more successful ex-
periences and much media approval, which 
increases their level of  confidence (Hayward 
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and Hambrick, 1997; Haynes et al., 2017).
An experienced CEO is more valuable 
than a new one as he/she has proven their 
expertise, this results in trust from the board 
and shareholders (Haynes et al., 2017; Sewp-
ersadh, 2019). Taken together, a long-tenured 
CEO who has more successful experiences 
will be more powerful than a newly appoint-
ed one. Therefore, new CEOs have to make a 
greater effort to demonstrate their expertise, 
to gain the trust of  their boards and avoid 
dismissal. 
To gain trust from their boards and 
shareholders, newly appointed CEOs will be 
more likely to try to accomplish higher levels 
of  strategic actions, which result in significant 
changes in their firms, than their longer-ten-
ured counterparts would do (Haynes et al., 
2019; McClelland et al., 2012; Sewpersadh, 
2019). However, longer-tenured CEOs are 
more skilled in managerial expertise and have 
a higher network centrality for obtaining cru-
cial information (El-Khatib, Fogel and Jand-
ik, 2015; Haynes et al., 2017). Long-tenured 
CEOs, with a high level of  trust from their 
boards, will negatively affect their firms’ per-
formances since the boards cannot exercise 
impartial monitoring (Haynes et al., 2019; 
Sewpersadh, 2019). Therefore it can be ar-
gued that a long-tenure CEO has more trust 
from both the shareholders and the board, 
which allows the CEO to pursue value-de-
stroying investments that negatively influence 
the firm’s performance. Therefore, this study 
developed the second hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2a CEOs’ tenure positively 
moderates the negative influence of  CEOs’ 
hubris on firms’ performance in Indonesia. 
The longer the CEO’s tenure, the stronger 
the negative influence of  the CEO’s hubris is 
on the firm’s performance.
CEOs’ Ownership
Aside from the power obtained from 
the organizational structure, executives gain 
power from share ownership. A CEO’s share 
ownership in a firm significantly affects the 
decision-making process (Deb and  Wiklund, 
2017; Sewpersadh, 2019). In the two-tier sys-
tem of  corporate governance, where share-
holders can appoint every board member, 
executives with significant share ownership 
have greater control over the shareholders 
and the boards (Deb and  Wiklund, 2017; 
Sewpersadh, 2019; World Bank, 2014). More-
over, by being part of  the shareholders, hu-
bristic CEOs are less likely to face dismissal.
CEOs’ share ownership is ideal for hu-
bris to thrive since a CEO can then influence 
both the shareholders and the board (J. H. 
Park et al., 2018; Sewpersadh, 2019). These 
CEOs can form a strong bond of  trust with 
their boards and lower the level of  their su-
pervision (Haynes et al., 2017; McClelland et 
al., 2012). This situation increases the likeli-
hood of  CEOs carrying out value-destroying 
investments that negatively affect their firms’ 
performance (Deb and  Wiklund, 2017; 
Haynes et al., 2017). Therefore, this study 
argues that share ownership allows CEOs to 
have a strong influence over their boards and 
shareholders, which allows them to pursue 
value-destroying investments that are harm-
ful to the firms’ performance in Indonesia. 
Therefore, this study developed the third hy-
pothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2b CEOs’ ownership positive-
ly moderates the negative influence of  the 
CEOs’ hubris on firms’ performance in In-
donesia. The higher the CEO’s share owner-
ship percentage is in the firm, the stronger is 
the negative influence of  the CEO’s hubris 
on the firm’s performance.
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Independent Commissioners’ Ratio
The initial study by Hayward and Ham-
brick (1997) found that board independence 
significantly affects the vigilance level among 
the members. The BOC, which has the re-
sponsibility for monitoring the CEO and the 
BOD, finds its vigilance increases when there 
is an independent commissioner (Otoritas 
Jasa Keuangan, 2014; Tulung and  Ramdani, 
2018; Zubeltzu-Jaka et al., 2020). According 
to the Indonesian Financial Services Author-
ity (OJK) Regulation No. 33/POJK.04.2014, 
the ratio of  independent commissioners in 
public firms must be at least 30 percent of  
the total membership of  the BOC, and they 
must be without any affiliations within the 
firm (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, 2014). 
In the case of  monitoring, independent 
commissioners are likely to increase the vig-
ilance of  the BOC by being unbiased, since 
they are not affiliated with the firm and there-
fore can do a better job monitoring the CEO 
and BOD (Sewpersadh, 2019; Tulung and 
Ramdani, 2018). Accordingly, since the BOC 
relies heavily on the firm’s financial perfor-
mance in supervising the BOD, the presence 
of  outside commissioners subjects the firm 
to stricter monitoring and thus effectively 
controls any hubris (J. H. Park et al., 2018; 
Sewpersadh, 2019; Tulung and  Ramdani, 
2018). BOC members can exert control by 
disapproving the investment proposals that 
may seem to add no value to the firm’s per-
formance (J. H. Park et al., 2018; World Bank, 
2014). 
In addition, the presence of  an indepen-
dent commissioner eliminates the possibility 
of  “groupthink” in the BOC, hence making 
the monitoring more unbiased (Kinicki and 
Fugate, 2018; Tulung and  Ramdani, 2018; 
Zubeltzu-Jaka et al., 2020). Therefore, this 
study argues that the presence of  an inde-
pendent commissioner weakens the negative 
influence of  the CEO’s hubris on the firm’s 
performance in Indonesia by providing im-
partial monitoring of  the CEO and BOD (J. 
H. Park et al., 2018; Tulung and  Ramdani, 
2018). Therefore, this study developed a 
fourth hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 3a Independent commissioners’ 
ratio negatively moderates the negative influ-
ence of  CEOs’ hubris on their firms’ perfor-
mance in Indonesia. The higher the indepen-
dent commissioners ratio is on the BOC, the 
weaker will be the negative influence of  the 
CEO’s hubris on the firm’s performance.
Commissioners’ Board Size
A past study discovered board vigilance, 
in the form of  independent directors’ repre-
sentatives, controlled the negative effects of  
hubris on firms’ performance (J. H. Park et 
al., 2018). However, this investigation did not 
consider that the number of  independent di-
rectors’ representatives is determined by the 
board’s size (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, 2014). 
The development of  a firm is trailed by the 
complexity of  its functions, which requires a 
bigger board comprising of  members with 
different expertise and skills (Ali, 2018; Sew-
persadh, 2019). Bigger boards comprising 
of  various experts are better at advising the 
firm’s management and reducing the CEO’s 
power gained through his/her long tenure 
(Tulung and  Ramdani, 2018; Zubeltzu-Jaka 
et al., 2020).
Previous studies found firms with in-
dependent boards have positive firm perfor-
mance and a decreased likelihood of  suffer-
ing from financial difficulties (Sewpersadh, 
2019; Tulung and  Ramdani, 2018). Firms 
with larger boards and more independent 
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directors are better at handling complex data 
and have better monitoring of  the CEO 
and board (Ali, 2018). The problem that 
often arises with a CEO’s hubris is that the 
CEO often pursues investments for his/her 
self-interest, at the shareholders’ expense 
(Haynes et al., 2017; J. H. Park et al., 2018). 
Since the BOC is more independent, it can 
exercise rigorous monitoring and easily de-
tect a CEO’s non-value investment initia-
tives (Duru et al., 2016; Tulung and  Ram-
dani, 2018). In short, a large BOC with wide 
ranging knowledge and skills is effective 
in monitoring and preventing CEOs from 
pursuing investments in their own interests. 
In summary, a bigger BOC, whose mem-
bers have different knowledge and skills, is 
effective in monitoring a CEO’s initiatives, 
and can weaken the negative influence of  
a CEO’s hubris on the firm’s performance. 
Therefore, this study developed a fifth hy-
pothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 3b The size of  the BOC neg-
atively moderates the negative influence 
of  the CEO’s hubris on the firm’s perfor-
mance in Indonesia. The bigger the size of  
the BOC, the weaker the negative influence 
of  the CEO’s hubris is on the firm’s perfor-
mance. 
Figure 2 depicts the conceptual model of  
this study.
Methods
Sample and Data Collection
This study observed public firms listed 
on the KOMPAS100 February 2017 Index, 
which includes the 100 firms with the most 
liquid stocks and the largest market capital-
ization; this covers 70 to 80 percent of  the 
total market capitalization of  the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (PT Bursa Efek Indonesia, 
2018). This index was especially chosen to 
observe whether the establishment of  the 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) im-
posed a threat to Indonesia’s capital markets 
(International Financial Law Review, 2018). 
The weak capital markets and the external 
Figure 2. Research Model
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threat are interesting to observe since the in-
fluence of  the CEOs’ hubris on firms’ per-
formance is highly dependent on the capital 
markets’ conditions (J. H. Park et al., 2018). 
In collecting the relevant information, this 
study relied on secondary data obtained from 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), and 
firms’ annual reports, which are available on 
the firms’ websites. One firm was eliminated 




In this study, the dependent variable was 
firm performance, measured as the return on 
assets (ROA). ROA is an industry-dependent 
indicator of  how efficient a firm is at man-
aging its assets to generate earnings. Accord-
ingly, a higher ROA means greater assets’ ef-
ficiency. The previous study conducted by J. 
H. Park et al., (2018) used a two-year adjusted 
return on assets (Ad-ROA) by subtracting the 
firm’s ROA from the industry median ROA 
for each year and then averaging it. However, 
due to our inability to obtain the industry me-
dian ROA data, this cross-sectional study only 
observed each firm’s ROA for the year 2017.
Independent Variable
Following the study by J. H. Park et 
al., (2018) on the “unobtrusive” index of  
CEOs’ hubris, this study relied on second-
ary data to avoid bias in the measurement. 
The CEOs’ hubris measurement in this study 
followed two hubris indicators of  Park et 
al., (2018), which were awards and overcon-
fidence. The media praise’s measurement was 
disregarded due to the inability to obtain an 
accurate measurement method. 
The awards indicator measured the total 
amount of  awards and certifications received 
by the CEOs in 2017 (J. H. Park et al., 2018). 
The data for awards and certifications were 
obtained from the annual reports. The CEOs’ 
overconfidence indicator was analyzed by us-
ing the DICTION application and calculated 
following the hubris formula of  Armenic et 
al., (2010, p. 60):
Finally, the CEOs’ hubris measure was the 
sum of  the awards and certifications given 
and the result of  the DICTION applica-
tion’s analysis. 
Moderating Variables
This study had four moderating vari-
ables of  CEOs’ tenure, CEOs’ ownership, 
independent commissioners’ ratio and com-
missioners’ board size. CEOs’ tenure was 
measured as the number of  years each CEO 
held the position in the firm (Sewpersadh, 
2019). CEOs’ ownership was measured as the 
percentage of  shares each CEO owned in the 
firm (Combs et al., 2007). The independent 
commissioners’ ratio was measured as the ra-
tio of  independent commissioner members 
among all the members of  the BOC (J. H. 
Park et al., 2018). Commissioners’ board size 
was measured as the total number of  com-
missioners on the BOC. 
Control Variables
This study used three control variables 
namely: firm size, leverage ratio, and CEOs’ 
succession. Each firm’s size was measured 
as the natural log (i.e ln) of  the firm’s to-
tal assets at the end of  the observed fiscal 
year. The leverage ratio was measured as the 
debt-to-equity ratio of  the firm in the obser-
vation year. The CEOs’ succession was con-
trolled to avoid bias since a change in CEO 
Hubris =  praise + accomplishment + tenacity
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may have a significant influence on a firm’s 
performance (Huson et al., 2004; Sewper-
sadh, 2019). CEOs’ succession was coded as 
1 if  the CEO was newly appointed and 0 oth-
erwise.
Analysis
This study first measured the indepen-
dent variable of  CEOs’ hubris by adding 
up the number of  awards and certifications 
from the results of  the DICTION analysis. 
Afterward, hierarchical regression analyses 
were performed to test the proposed hypoth-
eses. The first regression analysis consisted 
of  three regression models (model 1, model 
2, model 3). Model 1 was the baseline model 
and consisted of  the control variables. Mod-
el 2 was developed to test Hypothesis 1 in 
predicting the negative influence of  CEOs’ 
hubris on firms’ performance in Indonesia. 
Models 3 and 4  examined the positive mod-
erating effects of  CEOs’ tenure and CEOs’ 
ownership, as formulated in hypotheses 2a 
and 2b. Models 5 and 6  examined the neg-
ative moderating effects of  the independent 
commissioners’ ratio and commissioners’ 
board size, as formulated in hypotheses 3a 
and 3b. 
The validity of  the hypotheses testing 
results were confirmed by a robustness test, 
in which additional regressions were carried 
out to find out whether the results changed 
under different circumstances, this would 
confirm the structural validity of  the research 
(Lu and  White, 2014). First, the 39 samples 
that were included in the CEOs’ succession 
cases were eliminated. Then, the remaining 
60 samples were analyzed using hierarchical 
regression analyses. The results from the hy-
potheses testing and robustness testing were 
compared to check whether the new mea-
Figure 3. Data Analysis Flow Diagram
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surements caused a change in the significance 
levels or the direction of  the coefficients of  
the predictor variables (Lu and  White, 2014; 
J. H. Park et al., 2018). Multicollinearity was 
assessed using the variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) score. A VIF value below the thresh-
old of  10 and a tolerance value higher than 
0.1 were acceptable (Hair Jr. et al., 2014). Fig-
ure 3 illustrates the data analysis process con-
ducted in this study.
Results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics 
and correlations among the variables includ-
ed in this study. The descriptive statistics 
show that the average ROA was 5.7 percent; 
the average CEO’s tenure was 6.5 years, and 
the average share ownership a CEO had in a 
firm was 0.59 percent. The average ratio of  
independent commissioners was 41 percent, 
and the average size of  the BOC was five per-
sons. The average firm size in this study was 
ln 14.57 while the average leverage ratio was 
4.29 times, and 39 of  the sample’s firms had 
new CEOs.
Table 2 provides the results of  the hy-
potheses testing. Model 1 was the baseline 
model, only consisting of  the control vari-
ables. Model 2 was developed to test Hy-
pothesis 1 predicting the negative influence 
of  CEOs’ hubris on firms’ financial perfor-
mance in Indonesia. Models 3 and 4  exam-
ined the moderating role of  CEOs’ power 
(tenure and ownership) as stated in hypoth-
eses 2a and 2b. Models 5 and 6  examined 
the moderating role of  the boards’ vigilance 
(independent commissioners’ ratio and the 
size of  the BOC) as stated in hypotheses 3a 
and 3b. 
Model 2 revealed a positive and signifi-
cant relationship between CEOs’ hubris and 
firms’ performance (β = 0.249; p < 0.05), 
which does not support Hypothesis 1. Sec-
ond, the moderating effect of  CEOs’ tenure 
in model 3 was not significant, failing to sup-
port Hypothesis 2a. The moderating effect 
of  CEOs’ ownership in model 4  was not 
significant, failing to support Hypothesis 2b. 
Thus, CEOs’ power does not have any signif-
icant moderating effects. 
The moderating effect of  the indepen-
dent commissioners’ ratio in model 5  was 
not significant, failing to support Hypothesis 
3a. Finally, the size of  the BOC was found to 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Firm Performance 0.0574 0.094
2 CEO Hubris 34.58 24.42 0.254*
3 CEO Tenure 6.53 7.91 -0.014 -0.056
4 CEO Ownership 0.0059 0.034 0.096 -0.008 0.203*
5 Independent Com-missioner Ratio 0.41 0.13 0.056 0.200* -0.169 0.167
6 Commissioner Board Size 5.59 1.87 0.038 0.270** -0.062 -0.169 -0.122
7 Firm Size 14.57 3.91 -0.171 -0.035 -0.126 -0.046 -0.01 -0.016
8 Leverage Ratio 4.29 19.46 -0.047 0.001 -0.097 -0.031 -0.011 -0.127 -0.029
9 CEO Succession 0.39 0.49 0.017 -0.02 -0.509** -0.102 -0.17 -0.058 0.049 0.127
N= 99; *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); ***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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strengthen the positive influence of  CEOs’ 
hubris on firms’ performance (β = 0.191; p < 
0.1). The moderating effects are depicted in 
Figure 4 below. 
Robustness Test 
To ensure the validity of  the results, ad-
ditional regressions were performed to assess 
Table 2. Results of  Hierarchical Regression Analysis
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Testing variables
CEO Hubris 0.249** 0.233** 0.233** 0.248** 0.273**
CEO Hubris x CEO Tenure -0.025
CEO Hubris x CEO Ownership -0.052
CEO Hubris X Independent Commis-
sioner Ratio -0.004
CEO Hubris X Commissioner Board Size 0.191*
Control variables
Firm Size -0.174* -0.166* -0.166 -0.163 -0.165 -0.165
Leverage Ratio -0.056 -0.056 -0.057 -0.053 -0.056 -0.045
CEO Succession 0.033 0.037 0.031 0.045 0.039 0.025
CEO Tenure -0.016
CEO Ownership 0.114
Independent Commissioner Ratio 0.011
Commissioner Board Size -0.048
R2 0.033 0.095 0.096 0.106 0.095 0.127
F 1.078 2.465 1.62 1.811 1.611 2.234
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05 
Figure 4. Firm Performance and CEO Hubris Moderated by Commissioner Board Size
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the robustness of  the reported results. Fol-
lowing J. H. Park et al., (2018), the sample was 
reduced to the cases where there had been 
no change in the CEO’s position. Thirty-nine 
firms that had changed CEOs were elimi-
nated, leaving a sample consisting of  only 
60 firms. The aim was to find whether there 
was a change in the results for the main vari-
ables and the moderators after eliminating 
some of  the sample and one control variable 
in the regression (Lu and  White, 2014). The 
results of  the additional hierarchical regres-
sion analysis revealed that the new measure-
ments did not make a difference to the level 
of  significance and the coefficient’s direction 
for the independent and moderator variables. 
In conclusion, the hypotheses’ testing results 
were valid.
Discussion 
This study aimed to investigate the neg-
ative influence of  CEOs’ hubris on firms’ 
performance in Indonesia, and the moderat-
ing effect of  CEOs’ power indicated by their 
tenure and ownership, and board vigilance 
indicated by the independent commission-
ers’ ratio and the size of  the BOC. This study 
offered two conclusions: (1) CEOs’ hubris 
positively influenced firms’ performances in 
Indonesia. (2) Board vigilance, in the form of  
the size of  the BOC, was found to be effec-
tive in increasing the positive influence of  the 
CEOs’ hubris over their firms’ performances.
First, this study found that CEOs’ hubris 
had a positive effect on firms’ performance 
in Indonesia. Hubris can either be detrimen-
tal or productive to a firm’s performance de-
pending on the capital markets’ conditions 
(J. H. Park et al., 2018). The positive result is 
quite interesting as the previous study by J. H. 
Park et al., (2018) found that in a weak cap-
ital market hubristic CEOs entrenched their 
positions by pursuing self-interest projects 
that contributed to their firms’ negative per-
formances. However, this argument does not 
apply in Indonesia according to the empirical 
findings in this study. 
This interesting result is caused by the 
ASEAN Economic Community that posed 
a significant external threat to Indonesian 
firms. Faced with the high external pressure 
of  takeovers, hubristic CEOs in this study 
entrenched their positions by increasing their 
firms’ value (Hirshleifer et al., 2012; J. H. Park 
et al., 2018). In addition, the sample firms’ 
average length of  tenure for their CEOs of  
6.5 years indicated that most CEOs in this 
study only served for one leadership period 
and either quit or were dismissed during their 
second. Thus, these CEOs needed to gain the 
trust of  their boards by making more invest-
ments that would enhance their firms’ future 
performance (McClelland et al., 2012; J. H. 
Park et al., 2018). 
Moreover, Indonesian culture emphasiz-
es a high power distance and collectivism with-
in the culture (Koo and  Park, 2018; Suhoyo 
et al., 2014). Although a CEO has the highest 
position in the management team, Indonesia’s 
collectivist cultural dimension limits the CEO 
from being overconfident, to the extent that 
they rarely can claim “I did this,” as is often 
exhibited in Western culture (Koo and  Park, 
2018). Within a culture that focuses on collec-
tivism, a good relationship among each board 
member is very important, thus, a CEO must 
be accepted by the boards of  directors and 
commissioners (Koo and  Park, 2018; J. H. 
Park et al., 2018; Suhoyo et al., 2014). In other 
words, a CEO must belong to the firm and be 
accepted by the boards; some of  the CEOs in 
this study might be considered to be “new ad-
ditions” by the boards and need to prove their 
capabilities to be accepted. Hence, CEOs’ hu-
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bris in this study resulted in positive influenc-
es on their firms’ performance.
The empirical results in this study 
showed that neither CEOs’ tenure nor CEOs’ 
ownership imposed any statistical significance 
when moderating the influence of  hubris on 
firms’ performance in Indonesia; although it 
was argued that the increase in managerial ca-
pabilities during the year increased the CEOs’ 
power in the firms (Kinicki and  Fugate, 2018; 
Wang et al., 2016). The empirical finding in 
this study found that tenure does not increase 
the CEOs’ power. The average tenure of  In-
donesian CEOs in this study was about 6.5 
years, whereas the previous study in South 
Korea found it to be 3.5 years (J. H. Park et 
al., 2018). Despite the higher average length 
of  tenure and data spread, non-significant re-
sults were found in both studies. It is not clear 
why tenure is not significant, likewise the pre-
vious study by J. H. Park et al.,  (2018) cannot 
explain this finding. Thus, this finding implies 
that tenure is not a suitable measurement of  
CEOs’ power. 
Moreover, the insignificant result for 
the variable CEOs’ ownership was due to the 
very small share percentage the CEOs owned 
in this study. As presented in Table 1, the av-
erage percentage of  CEOs’ ownership was 
0.59 percent, which is very low in compari-
son to the study by J. H. Park et al.,  (2018) 
which found ownership to be 38.2 percent. 
The sample used by J. H. Park et al.,  (2018) 
consisted of  blockholder CEOs who owned 
more than five percent of  the shares and were 
members of  the founder families (i.e Chaebol), 
hence their high share percentage. There-
fore, share ownership’s percentage is not an 
appropriate measurement of  CEOs’ power 
for Indonesian firms, since most Indonesian 
CEOs only own a very small percentage of  
the shares in their firms. 
The empirical results in this study 
showed that the independent commission-
ers’ ratio did not significantly moderate the 
positive influence of  hubris on firms’ perfor-
mance in Indonesia. The insignificant result 
is quite interesting since the sample data’s 
mean value of  41.14 percent and a standard 
deviation of  13.10 percent were higher than 
the previous study (M = 0.318, SD = 0.149) 
(J. H. Park et al., 2018). One possible cause 
of  this insignificance is because an increase 
in the size of  the BOC is not always followed 
by an increase in the number of  indepen-
dent members, to maintain the 30 percent 
level as required by the OJK. This argument 
is further strengthened by the Pearson cor-
relation’s result between the independent 
commissioners’ ratio and the commissioners’ 
board size (r = -0.122, p > 0.05). Moreover, 
the independent commissioners’ data in this 
study ranged from 17 percent to 80 percent, 
which meant that there were firms which had 
less than the required 30 percent of  indepen-
dent commissioners.
This study found board vigilance, in the 
form of  the size of  the BOC, was effective 
in increasing the positive influence CEOs’ 
hubris had on firms’ performance. Initial 
studies had only considered board vigilance 
in the form of  CEO-duality and the indepen-
dent directors’ representation (J. H. Park et 
al., 2018) on the boards, without taking into 
account the boards’ sizes. This study proved 
that a bigger BOC was effective in preventing 
the CEOs from pursuing non-value invest-
ments.
A bigger BOC is more independent in 
exercising rigorous monitoring and helping 
the CEO with the strategic decision-making 
process, to make sure that every investment 
will yield positive results. Thus, when hubris 
contributes to firm performance, a vigilant 
Gadjah Mada International Journal of  Business - May-August, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2020
214
board significantly increases the positive in-
fluence of  hubris. In addition, some of  the 
sample’s CEOs only served for one period, 
in which they had to gain their boards’ trust. 
These new CEOs, who lacked power, were 
under constant pressure to prove their capa-
bilities to their boards and shareholders. This 
finding specifically explains that a bigger 
board is important for the growth of  firms 
and for preventing the financial distress that 
often comes from a CEO’s hubris. 
Conclusion
This study agrees that CEOs’ hubris 
research must be approached by taking into 
account the country-specific context (J. H. 
Park et al., 2018). The establishment of  the 
AEC was initially thought not to pose any 
significant threats to the Indonesian capital 
markets, yet it imposed such a threat that 
hubristic CEOs secured their positions by 
efficiently managing their firms’ ROA as an 
anti-takeover strategy. This maneuver pro-
duced a positive influence on their firms’ 
performances and such external threats must 
be taken into account when approaching 
CEOs’ hubris. The results also indicate that 
Indonesian CEOs should be more hubristic, 
in other words, these CEOs should be more 
confident in their decision-making abilities 
when taking on big projects and investments, 
since they will contribute to the shareholders’ 
wealth. In addition, the financial authorities 
and the Government of  Indonesia (GoI) 
should put more effort into making the capi-
tal markets  more active. This would motivate 
the CEOs to manage their firms’ assets and 
profits more efficiently, and thus, more peo-
ple will invest in Indonesian firms. 
Second, board vigilance is indeed im-
portant in managing CEOs’ hubris. Specifi-
cally, this study found a large BOC strength-
ens the positive influence of  CEOs’ hubris; 
although agency theorists argue that a big 
board is inefficient. However, this study 
found that a large BOC is effective in man-
aging the positive influence of  CEOs’ hu-
bris. A big board with members from vari-
ous disciplines and with varied knowledge is 
effective in preventing CEOs from pursuing 
value-destroying investments, and they can 
easily monitor and identify the CEOs’ mo-
tives. All in all, the results of  this study shed 
some light on widening the CEOs’ hubris 
research stream by providing external valid-
ity and a different approach to investigating 
CEOs’ hubris in the two-tier corporate gov-
ernance setting.
Limitation
Although this study explored the influ-
ence of  CEOs’ hubris on firms’ performance 
in Indonesia by considering the moderating 
variables of  CEOs’ power and board vigi-
lance, this study faced several limitations and 
thus suggests some useful recommendations 
for future research. First, this study disregard-
ed the CEOs’ media praise in obtaining the 
CEOs’ hubris measure, as explained in the 
section covering the research method. Based 
on the initial study by Hayward and Ham-
brick (1997), CEOs’ hubris is formerly built 
on the three indices: media praise, awards 
given, and the CEOs’ self-confidence. There-
fore, to obtain an impartial measurement of  
CEOs’ hubris, a situational assessment in the 
form of  the media’s reaction is necessary. 
Second, in capturing CEOs’ power, this 
study only relied on the previous approach 
used in the study by Park et al., (2018). CEOs’ 
power comes from their position and exper-
tise, therefore the power indicator may be 
approached through observable upper ech-
elon characteristics such as age, education, 
Rizka and Handoko
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and career experiences, to open new research 
grounds for the CEOs’ hubris research 
stream.
All in all, future studies should explore 
more determinants that can capture hubris, 
CEOs’ power, and boards’ vigilance in a more 
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1 580 0.18 8.97 4.06 1.5 135.05 0.25 11.38 4.53
2 332 5.11 8.65 6 1 110.42 0 6.15 18.44
3 431 0.73 9.89 3.96 5.15 125.9 0.59 1.5 4.43
4 1,384 1.6 14.1 6.23 1.69 115.53 0.03 5.38 11.51
5 254 0.62 10.54 14.36 1.5 138 2.5 8.18 2.5
6 67 7.09 9.97 5.75 0 120.69 0 5.75 9.65
7 138 0 6.69 0 1.67 132.11 1.67 3.34 14.52
8 1,073 1.26 6.16 3.88 2.26 126.13 0.44 5.51 3.39
9 632 2.22 4.98 5.7 2 128.49 0.5 7.23 11.22
10 134 0.48 14.29 10.2 0 128.57 4.08 12.24 6.12
11 1,589 1.22 2.28 11.68 7.72 115.55 36.28 10.99 2.51
12 219 1.78 16.43 2 4.17 117.71 1.04 11.46 3.12
13 671 1.41 5.77 9.05 3.75 134.04 1.56 6.31 3.56
14 26 0 15.62 15.62 31.25 125 0 0 10.62
15 1,229 5.85 16.93 5.78 3.02 144.32 2.81 4.55 6.31
16 256 0.5 9.5 3 1 66 0 4 44.67
17 178 2.55 19.13 2.73 2.73 139.34 2.73 8.2 11.86
18 1,876 7.26 4.2 13.59 1.53 146.72 8 2.89 4.51
19 147 11.28 17.11 7.45 0 127.38 0 3.8 3.8
20 79 3.6 17.99 10.79 3.6 133.09 0 7.19 10.79
21 1,400 0.56 7.48 3.8 3.9 128.15 7.02 4.47 4.26
22 320 4.52 12.17 5.09 9.76 101.56 0 7.09 9.51
23 183 1.43 13.32 2.87 0 118.91 1.43 11.46 11
24 369 1.68 11.45 7.61 8.74 126.98 0.5 7.24 5.37
25 683 2.64 7.08 4.81 1.25 120.62 3.94 8.13 8.33
26 465 0.75 3.47 3.48 1.5 150.08 0.25 3.25 3.75
27 377 0 6.19 5.23 0.5 144.49 0.5 6.59 10.05
28 1,207 0.82 131.63 2.71 0.59 191.47 0.81 3.66 2.63
29 197 1.15 21.39 3.45 2.3 140.23 3.45 9.19 6.9
30 681 0.85 13.74 1.99 1.12 129.06 0.5 4.5 3.96
31 143 2.27 4.48 0 1.84 123.16 7.35 5.51 3.68
32 636 1.79 8.32 5.87 2.13 129.43 0.5 6.01 4.68
33 587 5.69 9.6 7.35 2.5 139.32 1.11 3.11 1.17
34 528 0.54 7.98 9.02 2.25 136.08 0.25 3.5 5.93
35 171 0 5.95 1.49 0 156.25 0 7.44 5.48
36 325 0.5 4.75 3.35 6.2 129.11 0 6.7 4.19
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37 1,318 1.32 7.45 8.77 1.25 115.26 3.01 4 3.31
38 574 11.34 6.5 3.44 2.25 127.25 0.75 3.5 2.83
39 342 3.33 13.03 1.5 2.61 143.72 5.43 4 2.34
40 1,009 3.21 5.49 6.55 2.94 154.42 0.94 7.53 3.73
41 123 5.33 6.64 6.64 2.21 163.72 4.43 4.43 5.93
42 495 1.76 7.81 6.54 4.53 122.16 0.5 5.05 9.38
43 471 4.3 5.81 6.23 2 111.01 1.76 7.55 12.93
44 363 3.62 7.93 7.93 0 167.04 3.81 4.25 4.15
45 1,262 2.34 6.03 6.49 0.31 126.86 10.92 4.05 2.52
46 448 1.95 9.98 5.94 3.99 105.49 0 8.48 5.32
47 501 0.6 5.94 3.48 1 119.81 1.75 3.25 10.19
48 1,418 2.6 6.84 4.72 0.77 147.68 1.88 4.7 4.95
49 692 3.74 14.49 7.26 2.53 133.66 2.07 10.18 4.04
50 1,295 4.18 11.49 5.33 3.41 119.41 2.26 6.98 3.65
51 704 0.9 4.58 1.73 1.25 136.43 0.88 3.12 9.41
52 2,915 3.36 5.09 3.38 0.26 140.3 0.8 5.92 2.96
53 129 2.83 17.74 11.47 0 121.56 0 6.88 3.85
54 269 0.35 5.22 12.04 2.5 160.53 1.5 7 6
55 137 0 4.55 4.55 4.55 128.79 0 10.61 7.09
56 213 2.02 17.2 2.15 0 144.09 1.08 7.53 10.75
57 529 8.96 3.68 2.98 1.75 137.32 0.25 6.1 6.6
58 854 1.89 6.24 3.33 1.5 138.03 0.12 5.29 8.6
59 1,100 4.11 6.41 6.72 1.12 147.77 0.81 5.9 3.45
60 1,374 2.04 4.34 4.53 2.22 126.03 3.6 3.81 3.72
61 155 1.32 5.22 6.89 1.4 116.25 0 16.81 5.15
62 190 3.1 29.41 12.38 1.55 111.46 3.1 4.64 5.7
63 485 0.75 4.73 3.25 2.75 109.5 0.5 4.75 34.98
64 243 1.12 4.53 3 2 63 1.5 2.5 25
65 372 7.14 4.07 2 3.07 113.89 0 6.14 11.43
66 238 0 9.34 7.69 2.2 117.58 3.3 6.59 4.04
67 845 2.41 7.05 6.25 3.12 147.49 0.25 4.86 4.32
68 110 2.23 2.23 2.23 4.46 133.93 4.46 4.46 4.46
69 582 12.45 11.06 6.27 8.07 140.68 0.5 6.02 9.24
70 283 1.5 10.45 4 1.5 107.55 2.5 3.5 12.15
71 743 0.4 10.49 9.8 5.32 138.49 1.97 2.25 4.35
72 796 2.48 8.77 5.81 0.75 160.91 0.25 5.2 4.22
73 64 8.53 4.27 0 0 156.98 0 0 0
74 804 2 5.67 4.47 4.5 151.61 0 5.56 5.15
75 1,327 2.12 10.51 5.62 2.85 123.29 0.69 2.85 8.51
76 290 6.05 7.18 5 5.93 134.47 1.5 4.31 4.62
77 677 2.12 9.81 5.76 0.56 136.16 1.06 6.07 3.43
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78 146 1.89 6.9 2.01 0 128.51 0 10.04 5.38
79 61 4.23 6.02 6.02 0 150.6 0 6.02 16.15
80 132 4.22 3.12 9.35 1.56 130.84 0 10.9 3.12
81 664 1.73 8.49 5.91 2.14 149.65 1.75 7.32 11.03
82 197 0.47 2 2 1.5 78.5 0.5 2 1.84
83 113 1.22 15.62 2.6 2.6 114.58 0 13.02 14.79
84 273 6.88 2.62 7.48 2.5 123.12 1 4 5.25
85 360 0.35 8.57 5.79 1.37 114.59 0.5 9.46 6.89
86 296 0.5 7.81 6.12 0.5 138.72 0.5 6.43 3.65
87 136 3.89 4.57 13.7 2.28 130.14 0 9.13 15.98
88 727 0.91 2.79 7.45 1.25 163.33 0.38 6.79 6.54
89 90 4.5 0 3.65 0 124.09 0 0 10.95
90 360 0.35 8.57 5.79 1.37 114.59 0.5 9.46 6.89
91 1,614 4.53 4.7 6.36 1.56 155.38 3.01 4.88 5.27
92 296 0.5 7.81 6.12 0.5 138.72 0.5 6.43 3.65
93 136 3.89 4.57 13.7 2.28 130.14 0 9.13 15.98
94 2,800 10.51 10.71 9.76 2.94 157.81 5.48 2.54 5.26
95 898 3.33 13.1 4.92 1.75 138.43 3.5 13.35 0.12
96 2,111 12.29 7.03 9.56 0.94 110.22 14.52 0.75 6.24
97 16,765 7.83 4.84 5.16 2.54 113.97 4.33 2.44 9.04
98 75 5.06 3.01 4.1 0 135.25 0 0 2.79





















1 1.43 1.36 6.72 15.31 3.47 1.43 11.92 23.48 1.5 38.24
2 0.5 3 8.47 17.77 8.3 0 13.35 33.47 1 31.95
3 2.78 0 3.78 3.91 2.18 0.59 23.46 59.39 3.96 37.05
4 3.04 0.36 6.49 9.84 6.25 2.36 20.07 26.37 1.63 25.46
5 2.5 0 2.5 10.18 1 1.5 49.27 24.75 4 47.23
6 5.75 0 0 11.49 5.75 0 0 17.24 11.49 17.24
7 0 0 1.67 13.77 1.67 0 23.41 33.44 1.67 40.13
8 1.41 0 3.82 5.22 0.69 0.91 16.57 48.92 2.1 39.5
9 5.15 1.83 10.72 11.63 7.3 1.58 22.58 19.9 2.83 44.57
10 2.04 0 2.04 20.41 4.08 2.04 8.16 18.37 3.37 55.1
11 10.98 0.57 3.55 3.69 0.91 0.98 14.96 21.36 0.85 26.96
12 3.12 0 1.04 12.5 3.12 0 17.71 56.25 0 46.88
13 3.37 0.65 3.71 9.63 2.56 1.31 29.31 23.3 1.25 39.69
14 0 0 0 15.62 0 0 31.25 31.25 0 31.25
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15 7.09 0 5.21 7.89 2.48 0.28 31.35 16.84 0.84 35.88
16 1 1 3 1.5 1.5 1 10 19.5 0 23.89
17 4.1 0 10.93 8.65 2.73 0 16.39 5.46 0 59.13
18 3.87 0.06 6.51 7.86 0.4 1.9 29.16 13.29 3.39 33.89
19 1.9 0 5.7 17.01 5.7 0 30.42 13.31 0 23.36
20 0 0 3.6 25.18 7.19 0 10.79 57.55 0 39.57
21 8.2 0.59 3.83 13.87 0.41 0.2 26.44 55.32 1.66 38.01
22 1 0 4 6.09 7.17 0.5 20.26 7 0 54.41
23 2.87 0 2.87 8.6 2.87 0 21.49 57.31 5.73 38.68
24 2.5 0 4.87 11.38 2.18 1.18 19.12 32.22 1.68 42.22
25 3.94 3.98 2.27 6.53 2.69 0.65 16.89 21.73 2.69 32.4
26 2 0.25 2.75 6.56 0.75 0.5 9.7 9 0.75 22.05
27 5.46 0 10.19 10.82 1.37 0 35.34 25.09 1 43.06
28 0.75 0.09 4.66 4.36 0.88 0.91 13.82 13.39 1.5 16.79
29 1.15 0 3.45 10.35 0 0 20.69 25.29 0 44.83
30 2.12 0.12 3.75 3.4 10.63 0.12 11.98 13.62 1.16 38.71
31 5.51 1.84 5.51 1.64 3.68 0 39.75 14.71 0 18.38
32 0 0.25 10.76 6.86 2.13 1.63 27.16 40.52 3.19 29.23
33 1.75 0.86 8.53 3.14 1.61 2.46 36.16 29.92 4.34 30.77
34 4.21 0 13.06 5.18 5.43 1 21.36 19.42 0.75 36.29
35 4.46 0 4.46 19.49 2.98 0 22.32 22.32 1.49 39.31
36 4.5 0 5.6 5.07 1.85 0.5 22.22 35.07 9.41 35.35
37 2.22 0.31 5.12 8.81 3.32 3.1 12.39 23.16 0.75 37.03
38 3 0.75 3 5.34 11.25 1 9.45 10.5 0.75 25.51
39 4.61 0 2 5.22 1 1.11 27.08 51.5 5.82 26.56
40 2.02 0 5.3 4.63 1.44 0.69 17.43 13.49 3.86 27.34
41 4.43 2.21 2.21 4.43 2.21 0 22.12 17.7 2.21 19.91
42 6.54 0 13.09 7.26 4.05 1.01 18.84 15.56 4.03 37.1
43 4.03 1.5 8.81 9.19 5.27 1 15.26 16.03 1 39.24
44 2.31 0 3.62 8.25 1.81 1.81 19.62 28.24 0.81 29.5
45 5.11 0.5 3.09 11.05 4.57 4.14 17.16 21.93 5.18 33.36
46 5.49 3.24 4.24 9.81 3.98 0 15.66 20.97 0.5 54.85
47 5.22 0 4.47 11.28 14.39 0 18.89 28.22 1.91 35.83
48 5.78 0.14 8.13 10.79 0.91 0.8 20.97 18.36 3.76 34.89
49 6.66 0.25 4.7 3.01 2.35 1.82 36.28 14.45 5.7 28.5
50 1.59 0.44 7.91 17.82 8.95 0.31 16.44 17.41 1 35.61
51 2.25 0.5 2.62 23.38 1.38 0.25 20.78 17.62 1.25 52.75
52 1.31 2.66 7.73 8.09 5.95 0.57 22.44 11.69 3.72 39.09
53 2.29 0 9.17 20.39 2.29 0 11.47 16.06 0 50.46
54 10.08 0.5 1 2.17 1 0.5 24.61 46.97 2.5 25.16
55 4.55 0 4.55 10.61 0 0 10.61 71.21 0 37.88
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56 5.38 0 5.38 6.93 2.15 0 37.63 29.03 3.92 53.76
57 1.75 0 15.55 17.12 4.85 1.5 12.83 22 0.75 28.72
58 4.41 1.83 10.79 8.45 5.62 0 30.5 16.25 3.29 41.9
59 4.67 0.5 6.81 6.79 1.25 0.12 28.31 9.8 1.31 33.97
60 1.56 0.47 7.02 2.22 4.33 0.66 22.11 13.92 0.89 25.56
61 1.4 0 5.6 7 0 0 15.41 85.43 4.2 39.22
62 1.55 0 3.1 6.19 1.55 3.1 13.7 18.58 4.64 20.12
63 1.75 0.25 2 4.58 2 0.75 9 35.17 1.41 50.63
64 2 0 3 30.72 0.5 1 11 29 2 42.5
65 5.14 0.5 17.43 14.19 7.79 0.5 20.62 6.5 1.5 28.88
66 12.09 0 3.3 4.89 1.1 0 23.08 30.77 1.1 31.87
67 2.12 0.62 5.37 8.8 2.12 0.62 24.69 31.46 2.62 39.66
68 3.35 2.23 6.7 7.69 4.46 0 33.48 22.32 2.23 20.09
69 4.77 0 5.55 4.49 0.5 1 19 12.3 0.5 29.51
70 2 0 4 8.95 2.58 0 28.54 70.81 1.5 27.73
71 7.3 0.12 4.1 6.43 0.62 0.25 31.74 45.67 1.38 42.24
72 4.31 0.64 5.12 5.92 3.08 0.89 20.97 30.43 2.16 28.99
73 5.81 0 0 11.63 5.81 0 11.63 17.44 11.63 17.44
74 6.88 0 10.44 5.32 4.41 2.94 27.24 28.66 3.44 35.11
75 1.12 2.16 8.58 5.78 6.17 1.62 18.47 21.57 1.12 18.17
76 3.31 0.5 3.81 7.31 1 0.5 18.87 48.93 3.31 29.49
77 1 1.56 7.39 16.41 6.08 1.38 27.23 23 2.44 25.04
78 0 0 8.03 6.02 0 0 18.07 30.12 2.01 38.15
79 0 6.02 0 6.02 6.02 0 12.05 18.07 0 36.15
80 3.12 0 12.46 0 3.12 0 20.25 74.77 1.56 31.15
81 2.52 0 4.81 10.17 2.91 0.75 28.34 15.36 1.5 34.71
82 2.5 0 1.5 2.5 0.5 0 15.7 22.5 2 21.64
83 0 0 7.81 13.02 5.21 0 20.83 20.83 2.6 44.27
84 4 3.48 10.43 10.4 10.43 0.5 24.85 17.43 1 27.93
85 1 1 9.82 5.8 4.32 2.5 25.21 42.92 1.37 22.72
86 2 0 2 9.33 2.5 1.5 16.25 48.61 2 41.74
87 0 0 6.85 12.43 2.28 0 9.13 36.53 2.28 43.38
88 3.25 0.38 22.04 14.24 2 0.75 19.3 14.5 5.29 57.22
89 3.65 0 7.3 7.3 10.95 0 32.85 29.2 0 62.04
90 1 1 9.82 5.8 4.32 2.5 25.21 42.92 1.37 22.72
91 3.3 0.78 6.96 6.15 1.12 0.67 28.4 29.87 3.03 26.32
92 2 0 2 9.33 2.5 1.5 16.25 48.61 2 41.74
93 0 0 6.85 12.43 2.28 0 9.13 36.53 2.28 43.38
94 3.99 0.32 8.79 4.84 2.6 8.22 15.99 7.01 1.32 7.96
95 2.12 0.38 6.87 0.54 0.62 2.12 21.29 24.97 6.24 20.79
96 3.07 1.37 6.86 1.2 2.48 20.83 24.55 1.16 3.28 5.89
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97 3.67 17.76 2.98 0.92 0.82 3.04 6.73 14.49 1.57 6.28
98 0 0 4.1 4.1 4.1 0 16.39 81.97 0 24.59

















1 10.44 10.49 0.5 10.16 4.13 2.24 6.8 1.43
2 3.83 17.27 2.5 8.15 3.33 5.15 7.58 0.5
3 4.28 13.31 3 5.92 1.59 0.5 2.23 0.59
4 7.84 11.27 0.75 7.21 5.1 5.23 8.73 0.81
5 7.68 33.66 7.18 1.5 7.68 2.5 18.71 1.5
6 11.49 12.18 0 8.62 0 0 10.14 0
7 5.02 12.33 1.67 11.71 1.67 1.67 2.46 0
8 10.9 6.4 2.03 12.21 4.49 1.86 5.82 1.38
9 8.97 22.15 1 6.74 10.59 3.69 6.68 0.66
10 2.04 20.41 0 4.08 8.16 2.04 9.72 0
11 14.16 6.06 2.51 9.59 2.92 0.45 3.86 0.05
12 7.29 12.85 3.12 9.38 6.25 1.04 10.92 2.08
13 8.68 22.1 2.15 5.81 2.15 0.38 3.93 2.56
14 0 0 15.62 0 0 0 0 15.62
15 9.97 21.01 2.49 7.5 6.79 0.31 4.89 0.78
16 4 2.5 1.5 50.17 3.74 2 3.8 0
17 8.2 23.1 4.1 6.83 4.1 0 10.07 0
18 16.04 22.27 2.67 2.88 5.95 0.3 2.09 0.74
19 5.7 15.92 1.9 3.8 3.8 4.75 1.9 0
20 0 17.99 0 7.19 0 7.19 0 0
21 10.06 10.43 2.68 9.4 1.94 2.92 7.19 0.06
22 5.59 10.09 3.09 12.67 6.76 1.25 19.61 0.5
23 2.87 7.16 0 4.3 3.58 1.43 9.69 1.43
24 3.18 12.25 2.68 16.79 4.7 1.6 5.18 0.5
25 6 7.36 0.25 8.08 11.03 2.45 9.33 2.83
26 2.5 20.25 1 3.75 2.41 0.82 2.44 0.25
27 9.65 27.58 1 6.73 8.6 1.82 3.13 1
28 3.86 133.93 1.56 3.84 4.03 0.77 2.86 0.75
29 5.75 19.54 2.3 5.75 3.45 0 8.93 0
30 11.01 19.7 0.5 34.28 2.99 1.12 13.46 0.62
31 7.35 24.82 0 28.49 8.27 1.84 14.1 0
32 8.66 17.74 3.38 8.07 2.42 2.82 5.76 0.75
33 7.46 24.45 4.82 6.5 4.9 3.21 2.86 2.5
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34 4.96 15.46 0 3.62 4.28 2.46 7.53 0.75
35 2.98 24.36 1.49 11.9 2.98 1.49 5.7 0
36 9.56 16.76 6.7 21.61 6.7 1 5.23 4.7
37 5.1 12.24 1.28 14.68 14.99 3.44 10.8 6.83
38 5.25 10.52 1.5 7.25 3.39 1 4.4 1
39 6.53 16.24 1.5 12.07 2.83 1.33 2 3
40 7.77 19.4 2.2 13.13 4.3 3.02 7.26 1
41 2.21 24.65 0 12.17 11.06 1.44 4.43 0
42 4.03 14.69 5.04 7.55 7.79 1.83 7.59 2.51
43 6.53 7.49 2.5 7.79 5.11 1.26 8.22 2.26
44 5.78 20.24 2 7.25 10.18 1.81 2.8 0.5
45 9.68 15.83 0.94 6.85 5.87 4.57 3.54 0.94
46 7.98 14.2 4.49 13.22 2.97 1.25 11.17 0.75
47 14.67 20.68 1 16.94 1.64 7.86 9.86 1.75
48 7.12 20.53 1.27 4.97 9.29 0.7 5.36 0.44
49 3.37 16.36 4.73 21.31 4.28 5.5 6.83 2.57
50 7.36 7.44 0.31 15.05 6.35 5.44 7.83 0.47
51 3.88 19.23 1.38 3.81 3.01 1.04 2.8 0.38
52 10.47 17.25 3.09 4.45 6.59 6.56 3.99 0.17
53 2.29 18.35 4.59 3.44 0 0 4.05 0
54 3 13.77 1 4 2.45 4 7.41 1.5
55 1.51 19.7 4.55 24.24 1.51 0 11.51 3.03
56 2.15 26.56 2.15 15.05 2.21 2.15 7.53 0
57 3 15.28 2.25 6.47 11.57 7.4 5.77 1.5
58 5.79 24.56 2.58 10.08 7.54 2.21 7 0.88
59 14.01 20.25 0.38 12.49 7.8 0.49 7.7 2.01
60 5.44 11.78 4.74 19.6 7.82 4.41 9.57 1.53
61 3.5 14.01 1.4 22.41 0 0 3.96 2.8
62 6.19 5.42 0 20.12 3.1 0 4.64 10.84
63 3 4.72 0.25 4.38 1.74 0.75 21.7 0.75
64 7.5 12.36 0.5 6 4.25 1.5 3.34 1
65 9.79 18.53 1.57 11.15 10.13 4.11 8.52 0.5
66 6.59 13.19 1.1 13.19 9.89 0 7.69 4.4
67 4.73 19.63 2.74 11.23 7.03 1.12 4.24 2.25
68 8.93 30.12 0 6.7 4.46 2.23 2.23 0
69 16.11 18.68 1.5 9.8 5.64 3.27 4.3 1.25
70 4.08 6.5 0.5 12.65 3.5 0.5 4.63 6.58
71 3.12 27.75 2.22 6.14 9.25 0.42 2.91 2.6
72 3.29 16.92 1.39 12.69 5.77 3.13 3.62 0.88
73 0 34.88 0 20.35 0 0 0 5.81
74 6.06 21.49 2.75 8.63 8.03 1.6 7.69 3.94
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75 7.27 10.25 1.36 13.52 6.07 6.34 8.18 1.06
76 10.06 17.37 2.81 18.56 4.99 1 2.84 1
77 7.39 16.5 0.81 12.52 8.96 3.79 3.76 1.06
78 8.03 18.16 4.02 20.08 0 0 9.03 2.01
79 0 20.32 0 12.05 6.02 6.02 6.02 0
80 1.56 17.13 1.56 15.58 3.12 0 3.12 0
81 8.54 23.45 0.25 7.55 4.32 3.66 4.5 0.64
82 5 12.19 1 8.5 1 0 2 1.5
83 10.42 17.44 0 3.91 0 0 4.76 2.6
84 3.98 22.31 0.5 16.45 5.95 8.94 2.5 0
85 10.56 13.54 0.87 13.32 7.01 2.73 6.76 1.73
86 10.25 18.24 4.62 18.81 1.5 0 6.96 1
87 6.85 24.53 4.57 18.26 6.85 0 9.13 0
88 10.83 18.56 1.38 15.33 2.54 0.62 15.55 0.12
89 7.3 36.5 3.65 29.2 7.3 0 3.65 0
90 10.56 13.54 0.87 13.32 7.01 2.73 6.76 1.73
91 9.87 24.69 0.93 5.17 7.38 1.05 2.64 0.11
92 10.25 18.24 4.62 18.81 1.5 0 6.96 1
93 6.85 24.53 4.57 18.26 6.85 0 9.13 0
94 2.18 8.77 1.22 17.35 11.31 9.11 7.54 1.18
95 5.87 3.99 6.86 13.72 11.23 15.43 8.04 2
96 2.76 0.77 2.09 8.31 13.83 24.94 5.25 0.91
97 0.59 3.57 0.63 10.52 5.9 11.8 8.49 1.39
98 0 12.3 0 24.59 4.1 4.1 4.1 0














1 0 13.76 0.25 1.68 15.17 63.16 0.94 0.43 5.34
2 3.65 7.79 0 2.33 22.25 55.58 3.97 0.58 5.24
3 1 15.14 1.18 1 2.09 47.94 1.15 0.46 5.2
4 0.12 17.73 0.03 2.54 43.38 58.88 1.8 0.51 5.07
5 0.5 4.5 0 1 11.86 34.71 0.27 0.6 5.13
6 0 11.49 0 5.75 11.49 5.75 0.85 0.77 5.6
7 1.67 10.03 0 0 6.69 159.2 3.57 0.46 5.1
8 0.65 16.24 1.16 0.38 1.81 106.97 0.72 0.48 5.05
9 0 14.71 0.25 0.5 22.66 65.68 0.85 0.48 5.35
10 0 14.29 0 0 4.08 145.71 0.57 0.55 5.7
11 0 10.04 0.02 0.98 0.8 214.28 0.85 0.51 5.61
12 0 8.65 1.04 1.04 11.46 59.58 0.71 0.46 5.1
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13 0.5 12.71 0 1.15 5.18 83.21 1.26 0.52 5.59
14 15.62 0 0 0 31.25 0 11.62 0.81 5.53
15 0.28 12.6 0.16 1.43 5.64 208.55 0.94 0.49 5.77
16 0.5 6.8 0 1 0.5 41.3 42.58 0.75 5.61
17 0 20.49 1.37 2.73 12.3 116.8 2.79 0.49 5.39
18 0 16.99 1.43 0.61 1.74 198.61 0.62 0.43 5.47
19 0 10.27 1.9 0 13.31 145.44 1.4 0.56 5.49
20 0 26.62 0 0 7.19 66.19 11.79 0.57 4.93
21 1.21 14.56 0.47 0.25 0.75 96.98 1.26 0.44 5.07
22 7.67 10.76 0 0.5 26.93 23.4 1.39 0.62 5.65
23 0 17.19 1.43 1.43 21.49 102.29 1.3 0.52 4.88
24 0 10.16 0.5 0 12.92 90.46 1.09 0.55 5.32
25 1.15 15.79 0.25 4.38 21.25 78.58 0.95 0.49 5.21
26 0.5 10.1 0.25 1.25 8.5 59.42 1.1 0.67 4.93
27 0 13.86 0 1.37 3.6 139.18 1.05 0.5 5.38
28 0 8.76 0 0.06 5.72 33.05 0.82 0.74 5.11
29 0 14.37 0 1.15 5.75 83.68 1.77 0.45 5.52
30 0 8.94 0.38 10.51 40.66 55.71 0.99 0.67 5.05
31 0 8.27 0 5.51 16.54 215.07 0.5 0.53 5.3
32 0.94 16.13 0.5 1.88 7.07 93.34 0.95 0.49 5.18
33 0 10.25 0.5 0.5 2.25 205.11 0.29 0.45 5.2
34 0 5.3 4.43 2.46 10.6 84.46 1.95 0.54 5.3
35 0 17.86 0 0 4.46 178.57 1.18 0.51 5.3
36 0 17.11 0 1 10.2 79.15 0.36 0.55 5.2
37 0 14.73 0 1.16 33.77 50.61 0.4 0.61 5.2
38 0.25 9.05 0.75 1 57.5 17.8 0.93 0.7 4.86
39 0 11.32 1 1.61 8.43 101.95 0.68 0.47 5.01
40 0 20.05 0.06 1.89 6.61 87.46 0.51 0.48 5.2
41 0 12.84 0 0 13.27 94.91 0.49 0.54 4.87
42 0.51 19.38 0 1.53 22.74 108.55 0.82 0.5 5.32
43 1.51 14.93 0 1.26 26.42 63.08 2.08 0.57 5.51
44 0 17.82 0.5 0.81 2.5 130.49 0.44 0.45 5.11
45 1.42 17.36 0.06 3.14 17.8 106.08 0.39 0.53 5.2
46 2.24 11.83 0.5 0.5 14.94 65.64 1.51 0.55 5.66
47 10.92 9.19 1.5 0.5 31.83 45.13 8.19 0.57 4.93
48 0.3 19.7 2.78 0.41 10.24 62.52 0.62 0.57 5.08
49 1.6 20.92 1.32 0.5 1.85 147.46 0.55 0.49 5.04
50 4.93 7.35 0.09 1.12 18.35 68.04 0.89 0.56 5.51
51 0 8.75 1 1 17.78 34.95 8.42 0.61 5.34
52 0.51 16.53 1.75 0.18 15.15 86.32 0.5 0.52 5.34
53 0 14.68 0 0 9.17 82.57 4.85 0.59 5.63
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54 0 8.4 0 0 3 38.26 1.1 0.57 5.09
55 0 6.06 0 0 3.03 260 3.22 0.41 4.89
56 0 14.52 0 3.23 7.53 109.89 1.65 0.46 5.12
57 0.5 14.5 4.1 1 31.69 22.05 0.84 0.63 5.07
58 0 13.82 1.71 3.91 17.91 114.06 0.93 0.52 5.39
59 0 17.4 0.12 0.94 26.5 85.8 0.46 0.5 5.25
60 0 22.15 0 2.76 36.04 40.38 0.4 0.58 5.09
61 0 4.9 1.4 0 4.2 78.99 1.45 0.43 4.88
62 0 19.97 0 0 32.51 52.63 0.77 0.59 4.91
63 1 30.33 0.75 1.25 31.17 25.8 34.25 0.74 5.17
64 0 1.5 0.5 1 1 64.6 25.57 0.73 6.4
65 1 7.56 1.57 1 13.36 56.66 0.99 0.61 5.37
66 0 16.38 0 2.2 9.89 97.25 0.42 0.52 5.42
67 0 17.97 1.25 1.49 8.84 77.67 0.65 0.49 5.28
68 0 31.25 0 0 8.93 140.62 0.71 0.49 4.94
69 0.25 10.95 0.75 2.52 8.57 46.53 1.73 0.61 5.52
70 0 7.48 0.5 1 1 105.1 11.07 0.53 5.3
71 0 24.2 0 0.25 0.75 92.99 0.57 0.49 5.08
72 0.77 11.74 0.25 0.38 9.25 61.12 0.68 0.44 4.97
73 0 17.44 0 0 17.44 10.47 0.08 0.74 4.88
74 0.12 14.61 0.25 1 9.16 51.13 0.58 0.51 5.13
75 1.17 18.94 1.19 2.16 28.82 29.2 1.41 0.54 5.09
76 0.5 8.31 0.5 1 0.5 124.24 0.69 0.52 5
77 3.39 20.55 0.25 0.75 6.76 96.5 0.38 0.48 5.39
78 0 14.06 2.01 4.02 4.02 79.52 2.79 0.59 5.12
79 0 12.05 0 0 6.02 14.46 2.44 0.74 5.32
80 0 16.98 0 0 12.46 269.16 0.73 0.41 4.96
81 0.64 13.48 1.14 1.5 7.93 45.76 2.26 0.48 5.27
82 0 7.95 0 0.5 1.5 56.7 0.83 0.7 5.56
83 0 25.78 2.6 0 18.23 74.48 5.1 0.59 5.3
84 0.5 12.98 1 1 18.36 63.18 1.53 0.57 5.38
85 2.6 13.77 0 0.87 28.63 156.24 0.83 0.48 5.21
86 0.5 18.77 1 0 1 86.61 2.73 0.51 5.02
87 0 7.76 2.28 0 6.85 57.76 1.9 0.62 5.65
88 0.5 9.01 0 0.5 16.88 53 0.86 0.6 5.36
89 0 10.95 0 3.65 18.25 20.44 1.44 0.66 5.26
90 2.6 13.77 0 0.87 28.63 156.24 0.83 0.48 5.21
91 0.03 15.52 1.22 0.48 1.7 126.85 0.83 0.39 5.19
92 0.5 18.77 1 0 1 86.61 2.73 0.51 5.02
93 0 7.76 2.28 0 6.85 57.76 1.9 0.62 5.65
94 16.54 33.99 0.52 4.91 32.7 19.41 0.55 0.52 4.4
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95 0 9.47 0.12 3.12 9.61 91.91 0.06 0.47 5.33
96 14.35 38.08 2.69 3.93 35.96 21.77 0.56 0.46 4.2
97 0.25 33.04 1.22 2.27 19.53 11.94 6.19 0.68 5.09
98 0 12.3 0 8.2 16.39 18.03 0.74 0.62 4.57
99 0 20.33 0 0 0 88.45 0.71 0.53 5.32
No. Complexity Activity Optimism Certainty Realism Commonality
1 5.34 49.71 54.88 49.42 43.75 54.72
2 5.24 42.57 61.74 44.36 42.76 50.3
3 5.2 50.73 51.69 43.59 41.94 47.24
4 5.07 45.88 56.69 46.99 46.67 52.81
5 5.13 46.32 51.95 46.7 47.29 49.63
6 5.6 47.94 56.94 39.33 35.5 56.81
7 5.1 45.77 57.03 47.67 44.38 49.8
8 5.05 50.86 51.09 44.36 43.42 51.67
9 5.35 51.19 57.35 51.88 44.81 51.76
10 5.7 49.55 55.76 49.63 40.76 53.52
11 5.61 49.86 43.36 48.95 39.87 51.52
12 5.1 51.17 53.57 42.83 45.58 51.53
13 5.59 50.4 52.95 49.26 42.69 50.77
14 5.53 33.51 56.04 30.6 44.82 26.41
15 5.77 51.92 53.28 53.48 45.85 51.09
16 5.61 -36.29 63.35 38.2 43.33 50.29
17 5.39 47.76 54.66 56.22 45.51 51.75
18 5.47 51.26 49.85 56.46 43.03 52.2
19 5.49 49.89 55.43 49.18 45.25 50.76
20 4.93 28.31 60.65 42.85 44.67 49.77
21 5.07 49.94 52.15 44.63 43.94 49.73
22 5.65 46.38 56.14 44.1 44.1 46.89
23 4.88 48.88 54.69 42.18 43.66 54.23
24 5.32 49.75 53.73 45.43 45.26 46.77
25 5.21 49.84 53.28 46.78 44.6 53.24
26 4.93 48.92 52.09 45.83 43.67 50.14
27 5.38 51.66 55.25 53.29 46.3 53.58
28 5.11 48.91 51.24 65.36 62.56 50.16
29 5.52 47.57 53.1 50.35 45.16 51.79
30 5.05 47.77 54.99 45.24 50.26 57.95
31 5.3 47.56 50.79 53.06 49.87 54.04
32 5.18 48.38 52.45 48.88 43.61 51.29
33 5.2 52.62 50.11 53.34 44.88 48.19
34 5.3 46.59 51.94 49.23 43.88 51.74
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35 5.3 50.19 56.4 52.6 45.34 51.45
36 5.2 53.59 52.48 46.66 43.28 47.72
37 5.2 51.39 52.2 44.71 47.27 50.91
38 4.86 51.78 54.82 42.3 47.01 49.96
39 5.01 53.27 49.84 45.1 45.52 50.88
40 5.2 49.32 51.82 51.98 44.66 51.91
41 4.87 50.04 52.15 49.57 49.44 49.23
42 5.32 51.08 55 52.81 43.52 47.77
43 5.51 48.42 56.61 47.04 42.37 50.97
44 5.11 50.84 51.71 51.25 47.59 51.28
45 5.2 51.97 50.87 48.04 42.51 53.63
46 5.66 49.45 54.44 46.65 41.79 48.58
47 4.93 34.87 59.02 43.64 46.01 53.08
48 5.08 51.39 51.72 49.96 45.28 51.53
49 5.04 51.3 50.75 51.7 47.2 49.67
50 5.51 49.35 57.03 44.91 44.55 51.86
51 5.34 37.63 57.06 45.43 43.36 50.12
52 5.34 51.81 53.16 50.32 43.6 50.92
53 5.63 42.5 55.87 49.4 41.2 49.45
54 5.09 48.23 51.77 40.42 44.71 50.23
55 4.89 44.79 53.96 47.83 45.33 48.35
56 5.12 50.67 54.79 51.76 47.86 52.6
57 5.07 51.42 54.46 46.17 46.72 50.34
58 5.39 50.98 55.09 52.87 45.71 51.52
59 5.25 51.23 52.27 52.49 48.44 54.07
60 5.09 48.92 51.8 47.66 48.43 49.41
61 4.88 50.03 51.95 40.91 43.03 53.92
62 4.91 52.31 51.71 45.15 47.7 51.45
63 5.17 -21.92 60.92 39.31 41.55 50.56
64 6.4 1.38 62.77 39.18 32.79 51.14
65 5.37 50.33 57.85 50.38 43.82 51.59
66 5.42 52.88 51.54 47.11 44.98 52.42
67 5.28 51.87 52.7 49.31 45.83 49.5
68 4.94 50.33 53.2 55.49 45.38 49.86
69 5.52 50.81 52.75 46.96 44.75 51.84
70 5.3 31.53 55.22 39.33 43.27 50.84
71 5.08 52.97 52.01 49.7 46.7 47.09
72 4.97 50.85 52.82 48.6 47.77 50.47
73 4.88 57.2 54.16 45.13 43.06 49.17
74 5.13 52.55 52.97 49.69 46.28 49.39
75 5.09 46 54.41 46.49 46.73 50.11
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76 5 51.87 52.2 45.1 45.05 49.1
77 5.39 50.26 55.55 50.52 45.85 52
78 5.12 45.9 51.52 47.16 44.06 54.26
79 5.32 46.12 57.8 40.95 45.06 48.74
80 4.96 50.1 51.68 50.5 45.29 51.43
81 5.27 47.23 54.93 50.53 45.88 53.25
82 5.56 50.53 50.79 41.43 36.58 50.07
83 5.3 43.28 57.3 49.5 42.35 54.64
84 5.38 49.47 56.25 48.79 45.17 49.17
85 5.21 48.03 53.68 48.39 46.31 53.73
86 5.02 45.95 52.59 45.58 44.9 51.02
87 5.65 45.32 56.64 45.15 42.34 50.24
88 5.36 48.22 54.99 51.47 44.74 52.79
89 5.26 53.08 58.29 47.32 48.76 50.92
90 5.21 48.03 53.68 48.39 46.31 53.73
91 5.19 50.29 51.47 54.06 45.31 51.88
92 5.02 45.95 52.59 45.58 44.9 51.02
93 5.65 45.32 56.64 45.15 42.34 50.24
94 4.4 48.51 49.59 48.21 53.01 50.93
95 5.33 50.14 48.66 45.04 45.36 51.82
96 4.2 49.09 42.8 46.68 49.6 50.05
97 5.09 36.9 50.48 42.03 42.75 42.9
98 4.57 49.56 52.79 35.21 48.85 53.44
99 5.32 55.78 51.21 51.9 45.43 49.43
